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ontology of action has this fairly striking entailment: If causal determinism 
is true, then not only is there no free will, there is also no action or intentional 
behavior at all. How plausible is this result? (Given the force and creativity 
of recent compatibilist accounts of freedom and agency, I am inclined, even 
as a libertarian, to favor a view whereby what is at stake in the compatibility 
debate is something more modest than the complete range of our distinctively 
human capacities for practical rationality.) These brief questions about some 
of the central claims of Goetz’s book might be taken to imply only what we 
already knew; namely, that philosophers (like myself) with established posi-
tions in this domain are unlikely to be moved its arguments. So be it. There 
is still much to be learned from Goetz’s development of them.
But I have been left with a somewhat deeper structural complaint. I began 
this review by highlighting the way in which the field of free will is particu-
larly ripe for a large-scale defense of non-causal libertarianism—one that 
would do for the view what Robert Kane’s The Significance of Free Will has 
done for event causalism or what E. J. Lowe’s Personal Agency promises to do 
for agent causalism. Unfortunately, I do not believe that Freedom, Teleology, 
and Evil quite fits the bill. And this is not because Goetz is insufficiently 
careful, creative, or resourceful. Quite the contrary. The problem, instead, 
is that the book lacks the scope and unity of a paradigm defense. As I have 
mentioned, each chapter contains argument and criticism absolutely wor-
thy of philosophical attention and reaction. It seems to me, however, that 
the parts do not hang together as a sustained and comprehensive defense. 
Goetz moves too quickly away from the core ontological issues that mark 
out the distinctive boundaries of his position. As a result, almost half of the 
book—chapters 5 and 6—is committed to issues that are unquestionably 
interesting and handled well but that do not deeply support the central the-
sis regarding non-causalism. Put another way, these two chapters are likely 
to strike readers as composed of material that would have made for a pair 
of intriguing appendices rather than as material constituting core chapters 
in a systematic defense. To be fair, Goetz was under no obligation to write 
the book I anticipated or to take up the defense project I claim remains to be 
executed. Perhaps it will be enough to note that whoever does eventually 
take up this project will find ample inspiration and illumination in Goetz’s 
book, especially chapters 2 and 3. Furthermore, each chapter of Freedom, 
Teleology, and Evil will repay careful study on its own terms.
Knowledge of God, by Alvin Plantinga and Michael Tooley. Oxford: Black-
well Publishing, 2008. Pp. x + 270. $84.95 (hardcover), $34.95 (paper).
PAUL COPAN, Palm Beach Atlantic University
Part of a Blackwell series (Great Debates in Philosophy, Ernest Sosa, edi-
tor), this specific volume is a debate about “theistic belief, i.e., belief in 
God, and, more particularly, the epistemology of theistic belief” (p. 1). The 
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prominent opponents in this rigorous philosophical tussle are University 
of Notre Dame’s Alvin Plantinga and University of Colorado—Boulder’s 
Michael Tooley.
The book consists of six chapters: opposing lengthy opening statements 
(60 percent of the text), responses, and closing arguments. In addition to 
an index, each author provides several pages of relevant bibliography on 
theistic belief (pp. 249–256).
In chapter 1 (“Against Naturalism”), Plantinga jump-starts the debate 
with “an epistemological attack” on philosophical naturalism (p. 1). Readers 
familiar with Plantinga’s works will not be surprised to read of his “three-
part indictment” against naturalism. This includes (a) the affirmation of 
proper function, which gives epistemological advantage to theism (natu-
ralism doesn’t afford us knowledge); (b) naturalism’s great difficulty in 
avoiding skepticism; and (c) the lack of room for mental life/beliefs given 
naturalism (assuming it implies materialism).
Plantinga describes theism as affirming the existence of a self-existent 
God with beliefs and affections, aims and intentions, who creates an orderly, 
science-friendly world with free personal agents. However, Plantinga’s 
reference to God as “a person” (p. 2), while apt for Judaism and Islam, is 
not so for Christianity, in which God consists of three persons. Thus, “per-
sonal being” is more precise and thus preferable.
Plantinga asserts that we can properly believe in God without proofs 
or evidence; as we do in the case of sense perception, we may simply 
find ourselves believing in God (via the sensus divinitatis), which is a kind 
of knowledge (p. 9). Plantinga then discusses his views on warrant and 
proper function: whereas a theistic environment, in which God has created 
our faculties, is conducive to knowledge, naturalism—which is interested 
in survival rather than true belief—has no room for knowledge; true be-
lief requires warrant rather than being accidentally true. Plantinga insists 
that proper function (something assumed by talk of health and sickness) 
requires design—whether through direct creation or gradualistic evolution. 
Naturalism has no room for proper function.
Plantinga insists that naturalism leads to skepticism. He cites Nietzsche: 
“This God left aside, the question is permitted whether being deceived is 
not one of the conditions of life” (p. 30). Plantinga wonders: Whence the 
content of a belief if it is merely a neuronal event? And why think any 
belief is true, given naturalism? And survival-enhancing beliefs could just 
as well be false as true. Why trust that my belief-producing faculties are 
reliable? Given this “really crushing skepticism,” naturalism turns out to 
be self-defeating.
Tooley in chapter 2 (“Does God Exist?”) raises some preliminary con-
cerns about the concept/knowledge of God (e.g., which theistic conception 
to assume; moral problems of hell, original sin, Old Testament ethics; issues 
with warranted belief). He then reviews a priori arguments for the coher-
ence of the divine attributes. Tooley notes how theists disagree about, say, 
whether God is outside of time or not. And though there are difficulties 
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with certain divine attributes, he acknowledges, “they do not tell against 
the concept that is relevant here” (p. 87). Granting God’s existence, Tooley 
then proposes, there are three (a priori) equiprobable scenarios—a perfectly 
good being, a perfectly evil being, and a morally indifferent being (p. 90). 
Yet in the absence of any positive reasons for any of them, Tooley proposes 
that atheism is the default position.
Tooley then offers an empirical argument against immaterial minds (or 
substance dualism) from a blows-to-the-head type of reasoning (pp. 93–94): 
the resultant brain damage inflicted corresponds to the ability to think 
properly. And what about non-human animals such as chimpanzees and 
gorillas, which seem to have similar psychological capacities? Do they 
have immaterial minds? Tooley concludes: “there are excellent reasons for 
believing that human psychological capacities, rather than residing in an 
immaterial mind, have their basis instead in complex neurological struc-
tures” (p. 95).
After noting the apparent hiddenness of God and evil, Tooley rolls 
out his particular version of the argument from evil. He reviews various 
formulations of the argument from evil, landing on “the most promising 
formulations of the argument from evil” as being “concrete, inductive, 
and deontological” (p. 108). He briefly notes “design faults” (e.g., wis-
dom teeth, the human spine, humans’ vulnerability to diseases, weak 
conscience, death’s inevitability), which naturalistic evolution could easily 
explain. (One wonders if Tooley pushes too hard here. Indeed, Richard 
Dawkins himself defines biology—and we could throw in the universe’s 
fine-tuning too, mutatis mutandis—as “the study of complicated things 
that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose.”)1
In his argument from evil, Tooley focuses on one concrete evil—namely, 
the Lisbon earthquake of 1760, which killed 60,000 human beings—that 
could have been prevented then by a good God existing at that time; in 
such instances of evil, their “wrongmaking characteristics outweigh the 
sum total of any known rightmaking characteristics” (p. 116). In advancing 
his argument, Tooley rejects William Rowe’s formulation of the problem of 
evil, which “does not work” (p. 117). Tooley claims his formulation renders 
God’s existence “extremely unlikely” (p. 146).
Plantinga’s reply to Tooley’s opening statement (chapter 3) begins by 
acknowledging that the death of the logical problem of evil over the past 
thirty years means “something of a comedown for atheologians,” who 
must advance “much messier” probabilistic arguments from evil (p. 152). 
But even if God’s existence seems improbable in light of evil, one must 
consider the total evidence (Plantinga mentions the sensus divinitatis as 
one source of justification). He continues by affirming that while God’s 
existence is necessarily true, like other necessary truths, this may not be 
self-evident to all humans—and believers could be perfectly justified in 
their belief that God exists. That is, God could still exist even if evil makes 
1The Blind Watchmaker (New York: Norton, 1986), 1.
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this seem improbable. Indeed, the intrinsic probability of any necessary 
proposition is 1 in any possible world (p. 161); God’s existence in all possi-
ble worlds would be one such instance: thus, “if [God] is necessary, then it 
is hard to see how Tooley’s argument is relevant. It appears to be relevant 
only if [God] is contingent ” (p. 163).
Plantinga presents other challenges to Tooley’s claims: Why shouldn’t 
agnosticism be the default position rather than atheism? And, if God is 
necessarily good, then this rightmaking property outweighs any apparent 
wrongmaking properties a divine action has. Also, in the biblical tradition, 
believers candidly acknowledge their horror at and perplexity concerning 
evil, but they can also reflect on the love of God displayed in the incarna-
tion and atonement of Christ. Plantinga closes with reflections from Job’s 
experience: God doesn’t tell Job his reasons for permitting the evils Job has 
experienced; rather, God’s reply indicates that “Job knows far too little” to 
claim that God has no reasons for allowing these evils.
In chapter 4, Tooley replies to Plantinga’s opening remarks. Tooley 
disagrees with Plantinga’s arguments that health and sickness should be 
understood in terms of proper function. A virus, say, enters John’s body, 
which prevents him from succumbing to, say, mental deterioration in old 
age or unpleasant terminal illnesses. Surely, John is healthier than normal! 
Thus “health cannot be analyzed as proper functioning” (p. 186). Further-
more, Tooley finds problematic Plantinga’s externalistic account of justi-
fication (which involves proper function) and considers unsuccessful his 
critique of internalism.
In tackling Plantinga’s objection regarding the impossibility of mate-
rial things having beliefs, Tooley takes a property-dualist framework in 
discussing propositions, intensionality, and beliefs. He uses the analogy of 
the simple-“minded” “Robo the Robot,” which has merely “quasi-desires” 
and “quasi-preferences,” in contrast to the more complex robot “Robbie,” 
which “has experiences and uses language” (p. 202). Tooley compares their 
capabilities and properties, claiming that Robbie’s indexical beliefs and 
sequences of experiences/qualia show that “[p]urely material entities . . . 
can have beliefs and thoughts” (p. 205).
Tooley then addresses Plantinga’s “most important argument”—namely, 
that naturalism is false and self-defeating, given the (either) low or inscru-
table probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Tooley insists that 
we can supplement “perceptual experience with scientific reasoning and 
theorizing, to arrive at beliefs about objects we perceive that are true, rather 
than false” (p. 216).
In chapter 5 (“Can Robots Think?”), Plantinga offers brief preliminary 
responses to some of Tooley’s arguments before addressing whether ro-
bots can think. Plantinga wonders whether Tooley may be trying to “soft-
en us up” by speaking of Robo’s “quasi-beliefs/-desires” before making 
the claim that Robbie can have experiences and beliefs. And just because 
brain states can cause sensations, this hardly gives us reason to think that 
material things can have experiences. (Note: Plantinga is in “enthusiastic” 
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agreement with Tooley over animals having immaterial minds [p. 223].) 
Plantinga dismisses Tooley’s arguments here as “the sheerest phantasma-
goria;” Tooley may as well claim that “my new and very complex high 
definition television has beliefs” (p. 234). And what about the content of 
beliefs? Why this belief (say, “I am being appeared to greenly”) rather than 
that belief (“I really hate that color”—or “I wish I were in Dixie,” for that 
matter)? Tooley, Plantinga claims, isn’t arguing; he’s just positing.
Plantinga then questions Tooley’s reply to the evolutionary argument 
against naturalism. Plantinga insists that Tooley just hasn’t given any rea-
son to think our beliefs are true or why one form of belief-content rather 
than any other should supervene upon our neural structures. Why think 
the belief-content must be true?
In chapter 6, Tooley replies to Plantinga’s discussion of God’s probability 
by claiming that beliefs admit of degrees. So Tooley wonders whether one 
can rightly be called agnostic if he believes that God’s improbability is 
0.75 or 0.95. And Tooley sees no reason to prefer a good God over an evil 
one. Applying this to evil, Tooley wonders what is meant by rightmaking/
wrongmaking properties if they (seemingly) do not apply to God.
Tooley then offers further challenges to Plantinga’s externalist account 
of justification, followed by questions about the incompatibilities in the 
various religions, leading Tooley to wonder whether, for instance, there 
is an inbuilt sensus divinitatis and whether religious beliefs are likely to be 
true. When it comes to evil, Tooley thinks evil presents a defeater to theistic 
belief since a person’s character “consists of the actions he or she performs 
and intentionally refrains from performing” (p. 245). Tooley concludes by 
stating that he does not find any inferential arguments for God’s existence 
to be persuasive, though he breezes by the ontological argument, simply 
appealing to Gaunilo’s counterargument without explanation.
In my estimation, the book is an excellent point-counterpoint text. I 
highly recommend it for a graduate text in philosophy of religion. 
Obstacles to Divine Revelation: God and the Reorientation of Human Reason, by 
Rolfe King. London and New York: Continuum, 2008. Pp. x + 281. $130 (cloth).
WILLIAM J. WAINWRIGHT, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee
In this interesting if occasionally problematic book, King argues that while 
a good and all powerful God would want to reveal himself to us so that he 
can establish loving relations with us, there are obstacles to his doing so, 
i.e., “feature[s] of the created order that may either block or hinder a form 
of divine disclosure, or [have] in some way to be overcome in order for 
God to disclose himself” (p. 5). Obstacles are a consequence of human limi-
tations: “it is a logically necessary truth that because creatures are limited, 
the number of ways in which” the God of traditional theism “can reveal 
himself to them is limited” (p. 54). There is, in other words, a “necessary 
